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Abstract
Although capital punishment in the United States is subject to much social scientific
scrutiny, there has been little ethnographic study of death penalty trials. This is not only
an empirical lacuna, but also a theoretically and politically important one: by failing to
take capital trials as primary objects of inquiry, the practices of lawyers, witnesses,
judges, and others are viewed as products of, rather than implicated in, the institution
of criminal justice. Based on an ethnography of fifteen death penalty sentencing trials
across the United States during 2007, 2008, and 2009, this article seeks to understand
the role of juries in capital trials. While judges customarily make sentencing decisions in
American criminal cases, capital cases require jury sentencing. Key to understanding this
unusual requirement is the recruitment of potential jurors into a role I term punitive
citizenship. Through the process of choosing ‘death qualified’ jurors for trial, capital
jurors are asked to call upon their own moral positions in conjunction with their
responsibility to the collective to decide on appropriate punishments for defendants
who are singled out for capital prosecution by the state. This ensures that capital jurors
take personal responsibility for the punishment decision. The article argues that this
process blurs the lines between state and citizen action, solidifies the types of homicides
that are designated worthy of capital punishment, and allows the state to neutralize
some of the historic problems with state-sponsored death sentences.
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Introduction
Although capital punishment in the United States is subject to much social
scientific scrutiny, there has been little ethnographic study of death penalty
trials. Legal scholars offer histories, analyses and criticisms of many legal com-
ponents of death penalty trials, but ethnographers1 have barely explored the
site. This is not only an empirical lacuna, but also a theoretical and political
one. The complex social world and phenomenology of the trial is an oft-over-
looked site of analysis for criminologists. By failing to take this as a primary
object of inquiry, the trial practices of lawyers, witnesses, judges, and others are
viewed as products of, rather than constitutive of, the institution of criminal
justice (Rock, 1993). This is especially important when studying an institution
with the symbolic strength of capital punishment. Actors craft even the most
potent of social systems, and studying actions and their meanings gives us new
purchase on how practices and institutions are co-produced.
Death penalty sentencing trials are exceptional sites in which to study the
practices of punishment decision making in the US criminal justice system. In
the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States, an offender’s sentence
is decided without a trial. Most are instead negotiated between prosecution
and defense as part of a plea agreement. For the small percentage of criminal
cases that do go to trial, the judge, who may or may not hear evidence
regarding the offender’s social history, sentences the offender in large part
according to state and federal guidelines. In order for a state to pursue the
death penalty however, the United States Supreme Court requires not only a
trial, but also a sentencing decision made by a jury (Ring v. Arizona, 536 US
584 (2002)).2 If a defendant is found guilty of capital murder at a trial where
the death penalty is a possible punishment, the jury reconvenes and hears
testimony about the ‘character and propensities of the offender’ from prosecu-
tion and defense witnesses. The jury then votes on whether the offender
deserves death, as argued by the prosecution, or life in prison as argued by
the defense.
This article attempts to make sociological sense of this exceptional involve-
ment of juries in criminal punishment decision making, asking: how is capital
jury sentencing produced in practice? Are there factors that take place in prac-
tice that help explain the institutional form? Drawing on ethnographic observa-
tions of death penalty sentencing trials around the United States, I found that a
key element of capital sentencing trials is the recruitment of jurors into a role
that I call punitive citizenship. This recruitment cultivates and selects jurors who
express a willingness to make a personal, moral punishment decision in the
name of the State. I theorize that this form of jury sentencing allows the
State to carry out a controversial procedure by sharing responsibility with
the citizens who participate, blurring the boundaries between the actions of
states and citizens. This suggests that controversial state actions may be made
more tolerable in general by blurring the lines of responsibility, and that this
blurring is one of the social functions of capital jury sentencing.
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Background
US death penalty trials, pre- and post-Furman
Modern death penalty sentencing in the United States is structured by a series of
Supreme Court decisions begun more than three decades ago. Today, in order for a
death sentence to be imposed, an aggravated murder must be committed in one of
the 34 states where capital punishment is legal; the murderer must not be under 18
(Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005)), or mentally retarded (Atkins v. Virginia,
536 US 304 (2002)); a district attorney must decide to pursue the death penalty; and
a jury must decide that the offender deserves the death penalty rather than a lesser
sentence. This modern form began its development the late 1960s, when countries
throughout the western industrialized world were abolishing capital punishment.
In the United States, many states had abolished the practice, and the remaining
states varied greatly in the level of autonomy jurors were given in deciding con-
victed murderers’ sentences.
In 1972, a national ban on the death penalty was temporarily established
through the Supreme Court decision Furman v. Georgia (408 US 238 (1972)).
Furman argued that racial bias against African-Americans directly influenced the
imposition of the death penalty; judges and juries were more likely to impose the
death penalty on African-American defendants than on white defendants. While
the Court was unwilling to find specific racial bias, it did find that capital punish-
ment was imposed upon a ‘capriciously selected random handful’ rather than those
who most deserve it, thereby violating the Eight Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. To remedy this, states created new schemas for capital sen-
tencing, meant to prevent arbitrariness. Solutions varied from state to state, but
generally required that juries consider evidence about the offender’s social
background:
The respect for human dignity underlying the Eighth Amendment. . . requires consid-
eration of aspects of the character of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of impos-
ing the ultimate punishment of death. . . [to prevent defendants being treated as] mem-
bers of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
death penalty. (Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US 280 (1976): 303–305)
The Supreme Court’s insistence that juries consider the character of the defen-
dant has solidified the role of lay people in making capital punishment decisions in
trials across the country. If a defendant is found guilty of capital murder at a trial
where the death penalty is a possible punishment, a second ‘penalty phase’ follows.
The penalty phase is meant to provide jurors with information about the defen-
dant’s character so that the sentence is appropriate not only to the crime, but also
to him as a person.3 While penalty phase trials are familiar in their form – opening
and closing statements, defendant’s council table and prosecution table, objections,
bench conferences, and witnesses called to testify, for example – their content is less
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familiar to the criminal justice system. For days, weeks, or months and to differing
degrees of effectiveness depending on the relative skill and effort of the participants,
prosecution and defense use a variety of tactics that they think will persuade jurors
to link the defendant’s particular character to a lesser or greater punishment.
Testimony might be taken from physicians, friends, and family of the defendant,
survivors of the victim, psychiatrists, psychologists, statisticians, religious figures,
prison guards, and others, called by both prosecution and defense. The testimony
of these witnesses can be used for opposite ends, depending on whether it is used by
the prosecution or the defense. A physician might explain a defendant’s impairment
at the time of the crime, or might suggest that the defendant will always be a danger
to others. A clergyman might testify that the defendant has found God and is
therefore salvageable or testify that the family of the victim has a spiritual need
to see the death of the defendant.
While the history of the legal rebuilding of death penalty sentencing post-
Furman is well documented (see, for example, Banner, 2003), we know little
about how the practices have been built. One piece in understanding why jurors
were more tightly integrated into capital sentencing to solve the problem of guar-
anteeing the defendant both individual consideration and equal protection (as
opposed to another solution), involves asking what this form accomplishes.
Scholars of capital punishment suggest that the death penalty has functional, cul-
tural, and political roles in modern USA (Garland, 2009). The death penalty is used
rarely but carries great symbolic weight. In 2002 for example, over one million
Americans were convicted of felonies, more than 14,000 homicides were recorded,
155 people were sentenced to death, and 71 were executed.4 Despite this, capital
punishment makes up a disproportionate proportion of the United States Supreme
Court docket (Latzer, 2002; Liebman, 2000), inevitably requires a position from
local and national politicians, and remains actively divisive in national public opin-
ion and policy debates (Ellsworth and Gross, 1994; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2002;
Jacobs and Kent, 2007; Langer and Brace, 2005; Messner et al., 2006; Mooney and
Lee, 2000; Soss et al., 2003; Stack, 2000; Unnever and Cullen, 2007). Questions
about whether the death penalty acts as a deterrent (see, for examples, Fagan and
West, 2009; Yang and Lester, 2008), and whether it is inherently racist (Baldus and
Woodworth, 2003; Baldus et al., 1998, 2009; Liebman, 2000; McAdams, 1998;
Radelet and Pierce, 2009) are two of today’s most enduring debates about the
system’s function. Debates about why the United States is the only industrialized
western nation to retain capital punishment invites cultural, political, and historical
theorizing about the USA’s ‘exceptionalism’ (Garland, 2005; Greenberg and West,
2008; Hood, 1996; Lynch, 2002; Sarat, 1999, 2002; Steiker, 2002; Whitman, 2003;
Zimring, 2004).
The everyday working of the institutions that constitute the death penalty
system has been shadowed by the interest in theorizing the whole, and this is
especially true of death penalty trials. The United States Bureau of Justice
Statistics collects extensive data on homicides, arrests, and prison sentences for
convicted murderers; advocacy organizations, such as the Death Penalty
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Information Center and Human Rights Watch, have extensive information on the
people on death row and state execution processes; and the National Center for
State Courts records all types of criminal sentences, but no national organization
tracks when or where death penalty trials are happening around the country, nor
their results. A few states and localities have begun to require such information,
but there is no national compendium of information about death penalty trials in
the United States.5 Without this information we cannot make systematic
claims about death penalty sentencing trials, and trial practices remain discon-
nected from the larger role of capital punishment. This study remedies this in
part by observing selected capital sentencing trials in order to begin to identify
common practices.
Methods
Because a lone researcher cannot undertake a comprehensive survey of national
capital trial practices, I used a systematic sample of trials for observation. In lieu of
any definitive population from which to sample, I used newspaper accounts of US
capital trials compiled by the American Judicature Society.6 These provided a
sketch of where capital trials take place around the country. By combining this
with previous findings suggesting that trial outcomes vary by county demographic
differential (Eisenberg, 2004; McCarthy, 2005), level of funding available for indi-
gent defense, and race of victim and defendant (Allen and Clubb, 2008; Baldus and
Woodworth, 2003; Baldus et al., 1998; Bright, 1994, 1995; Brundage, 1993; Fleury-
Steiner, 2004; Liebman, 2000; McAdams, 1998; Ogletree, 2002; Tabak, 1994; Vick,
1995), I chose selectively a number of state and federal death penalty sentencing
trials for tracking and observation, with the goal of maximum variation. During
2007, 2008, and 2009, I observed three federal and 12 state trials in Connecticut
(one) Pennsylvania (two), New York (two), Virginia (one), Louisiana (three), Texas
(five), and Illinois (one). Trials ranged from several days to several weeks. In total
this amounted to more than 600 hours of observations of the jury selection, guilt/
innocence, and penalty phases of capital trials in 15 courtrooms.7 The data and
analyses culled from these observations are the first ethnographic data compiled
from multiple capital trials across the country. They are preliminary in this sense,
and are meant to open doors for further exploration.
In the following sections, three major practices that structure jury participation
in death penalty trials are described. First, in every state the population of homi-
cide defendants must be greatly reduced to a group who are deemed most appro-
priate for capital juries to try and sentence. Second, the population of potential
jurors is reduced to select jurors who are deemed appropriate. Third, jurors and
offenders meet in proceedings that link the decision-maker closely to the decision
through personalized testimonies and individualized deliberation schemes. These
practices vary somewhat from state to state and courtroom to courtroom, but are
generally captured in the examples described below. Taken together, they accom-
plish a rare but weighty event in which lay people are recruited into the role of
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punitive citizenship. This functions not only to satisfy the Supreme Court require-
ment of individual consideration and equal protection for the defendant, but also
to ease some of the cultural discomfort with the death penalty more generally.
Making capital trials
‘The worst of the worst’: Making capital defendants
The first step in producing capital trials in any state is selecting which homicide
defendants will be tried capitally. In the public sphere, death penalty advocates
frame capital defendants as the ‘worst of the worst’ of violent offenders. The legal
criteria dictate that the death penalty is only on the table when an aggravated
murder is committed in one of the 34 states where capital punishment is legal,
and the murderer is over 18 and does not suffer mental retardation.8 Given that
there are many times more aggravated homicides committed in the 34 states than
there are capital defendants, those worth pursing capitally must be identified
according to some extra-legal criteria. As with all US criminal proceedings, it is
primarily the prosecutors who decide under what circumstances charges are pur-
sued. There are no national data describing even the most basic information about
capital trials, so we cannot easily compare the population of aggravated murderers
to those tried capitally. We know that an uncommonly high rate of murder in the
United States involves young African-American men, aged 18–24, as both victim
and offender, usually who are acquainted with one another before the incident (Fox
and Zawitz, 2009). The dual epidemics of killing and incarceration of young black
men arguably constitute the worst public safety problem in 21st-century USA, and
prosecuting these capitally could arguably serve the goal of deterrence. But these
are not the types of murders most likely to be tried capitally. Which murders are
capital jurors most likely to be asked to sentence?
To answer this question in lieu of national statistics, I conducted a content
analysis of one year’s worth of newspaper accounts of capital trials as a proxy.9
Though media accounts are no substitute for official data on capital trials, they can
be used to provide preliminary information that would not otherwise be available.
The compiled accounts enabled me to create a sketch of the types of defendants
that jurors are asked to sentence. Narrative analysis (Riessman, 1993) revealed four
types of master frames repeated. Note how the language shapes the social types
depicted:
1. An African-American or Latino man in his teens or 20 s commits a murder in
the street or other public settings such as a convenience store or fast food chain.
The sale or use of drugs is often involved, and there are often multiple victims
who are ‘innocent’ strangers. This category includes ‘cop killings’, and the
accused are sometimes referred to as ‘thugs’.
2. A slightly older white or non-white man commits a sexual act on a woman in
conjunction with a murder. The victim and defendant might know one another
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or have met in passing, and the woman is usually taken from a ‘safe’ place such
as her home or place of work.
3. A man breaks into a home at night and commits a murder or murders in the
course of a burglary. The victim or victims are often elderly or otherwise vul-
nerable, and the race/ethnicity of the defendant and victim are usually the same.
4. Either a man or woman commits an ‘intimate’ murder when a family member or
person involved with an immediate family member kills multiple victims of the
same family. It is rare to have a single homicide in this category. Children are
often killed.
In all four types, the defendant is portrayed as poor and heterosexual, and
usually male. Given that poor, non-white men are most likely to be involved in
homicides, this is not initially surprising. But taken together, the four types specify
situations beyond the most common type of murder, which generally involves two
young men who are known to one another. Instead these four narratives describe
what we might refer to as culturally ‘normal’ capital murders. In the course of non-
capital criminal justice sentencing, culturally ‘normal’ criminal acts lead to ‘normal’
sentences not accounted for by legal code (Sudnow, 1965). This is also true for
death penalty cases according to these preliminary data. The definition of the worst
types of violence is culturally contingent in any society, indicative of a collective
sensibility (Aijmer and Abbink, 2000; Stanko, 2003, Zˇizˇek, 2008). By examining the
narratives that accompany the cases selected to be tried capitally, the cultural
criteria for the worst violent offenders are evidenced. ‘Normal’ capital murders –
the murders that most often qualify for capital punishment trials – are depicted
in the media as thugs, marauders, perverts, or enraged cuckolds, suggesting these
are the types of murders that are culturally most abhorrent. Capital jurors are not
asked to punish the most common type of murderer – young men who kill other
young men – that could arguably serve the purpose of deterrence.10 Instead, they
are asked to punish the ‘worst’ as depicted in the above narratives. Capital jurors
are recruited into state punishment processes defined by cultural rather than prag-
matic crime reduction categories.11
Making capital juries
The second practice common across capital trials is the selection of capital jurors
from a pool of potential jurors, or ‘venire people’. Jurors in capital trials not only
decide whether an offender is guilty or innocent of an aggravated murder; they also
decide what punishment the offender deserves if found guilty. Picking jurors to
participate in a capital trial therefore requires a separate set of procedures from
those used to pick jurors on an everyday criminal trial. In non-capital criminal
trials, potential jurors answer questions about whether they know any of the parties
in the case, have associations with the courts or police departments, or have med-
ical reasons that prevent them from being in court all day, for example. But capital
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jury selection requires that capital jurors are open to both life in prison and death
by execution as a punishment for the accused. This makes for a strange and often
lengthy proceeding referred to as ‘death qualification’, in which potential jurors
must state categorically that they can consider a life or death punishment for
someone well before they have declared him guilty, before they have even been
seated on the case.
Capital defense lawyers and prosecutors routinely talk about how cases are won
and lost at jury selection, before any evidence is officially presented to the jury.
As one defense attorney told me, he lost several cases early in his career because he
did not know how to ‘cut’ a jury:
I shudder every time I think about how many times I got it wrong. . . One that haunts
me is the case where we had – put together a fairly compelling story of our client’s life.
Killed a two-year-old, beat her to a pulp. But we had two jurors that were holding out
[for a life sentence]. Then we had a guy on the jury who said well, if we just give him a
life sentence, he’ll be out in 15 years, so they come back and they voted for death. First
of all, they had misinformation, but the other thing is we didn’t. . . empower them to
hold out against the other jurors.
As this quotation illustrates, picking a jury can be as pressure-filled and haunt-
ing as what outsiders might consider the ‘main’ portion of the trial. In addition to
looking for jurors who are sympathetic to their positions, lawyers are also working
with such complex concepts as education and empowerment, as we will see further
below.
Jury death qualification in the US criminal justice system has its roots in the
early 20th century. Quakers were categorically not permitted to participate in pro-
ceedings that might lead to the death of another human being. This meant that
venire persons had to be questioned about their religious beliefs before being seated
on murder trials, as automatic death sentences used to follow from murder con-
victions. But it is only in the modern era of bifurcated capital punishment trials that
we have a national standard for probing potential jurors to assess their qualifica-
tions. During the past three decades, the United States Supreme Court has issued
multiple opinions prescribing to what extent a juror must ‘believe’ in the death
penalty in order to serve on a capital jury, with the clearest definition in an early
case requiring all jurors be ‘willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state
law’ (Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US 510 (1968)). By observing the practices that
accompany this procedure however, we see that capital jurors are not chosen for
their ability to see both sides alone.
Days or weeks before the date of trial, depending on the organization of the
court, dozens of jury summons are sent through the mail to venire persons. On the
given day, they descend in mass and are given questionnaires to fill out. These are
sometimes lengthy – up to 20 or 30 pages – and include questions about political
affiliation, religious preference, education, media consumption, previous knowl-
edge of the case, and personal history with the criminal justice system. In addition,
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the questionnaires include inquiries into death penalty attitudes. The most general
might ask, ‘What are your feelings about the death penalty?’ But they can also be
very explicit, with questions that generalize from the specific details of the case. For
example, in a case of involving an African-American defendant, one question
asked:
Regarding the death penalty, which of the following statements most accurately rep-
resents the way you feel?
() I feel that the death penalty is applied fairly against minorities.
() I feel strongly that the death penalty is applied fairly against minorities.
() I feel that the death penalty is applied unfairly against minorities.
() I feel strongly that the death penalty is applied unfairly against minorities.
() I have no opinion whether the death penalty is applied unfairly against minorities
Upon completion, each venire person is given a number that corresponds with
his or her numbered questionnaires. The completed questionnaires are copied and
go to the prosecution and the defense for consideration. A number of venire per-
sons will be dismissed immediately because of some problem with their answers.
The remaining venire people are brought into the courtroom. Having received the
questionnaires, judges and lawyers begin questioning potential jurors individually
with the intention of dismissing all but the 12 to 15 people who will eventually act
as jurors and juror alternates. At first, this makes for a confusing spectacle.
Prosecutors, rather than trying to convince possible jurors to potentially vote for
the death penalty, try to eliminate those that might not. This can make prosecutors
sound like they are against the death penalty. Here a prosecutor asks a venire
person about her questionnaire:
Prosecutor: Ma’m, I see you call yourself a Christian here. Does this affect your ability
to impose the death penalty in any way? For example, I might believe as a good
Christian that only God has the right to judge another human being.
Venire person: No sir, I believe that a person has to be responsible for his actions. He’s
got to answer to his fellow man on earth before he answers to God in heaven too.
Prosecutor: Okay, good, good. . .
Conversely, when a defense attorney in a different case questions a venire person
who seems likely to be sympathetic to the defendant, she probes further.
Defense attorney: Suppose the defendant was shown to be a Mexican national here
without papers. How do you feel about illegal immigrants? Do you think they should
have the right to take up all of our time here? Or should we just deport them?
Potential juror: I really don’t have a blanket opinion.
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Defense attorney: Well, do you speak Spanish?
Potential juror: I grew up in Texas so I know all the bad words.
(Everyone laughs. . .)
This reverse-questioning technique not only assures the court that the venire
people can consider both life and death sentences, it also works to find jurors who
are comfortable enunciating their positions, and sticking with them despite oppo-
sition. After satisfying himself that the venire person above is comfortable with the
death penalty in the abstract, the prosecutor moves closer to stand next to her and
lowers his voice to a more intimate tone:
Prosecutor: Now (pointing to a small woman sitting off to the side in one of the rows
of audience benches who looks to be in her 60 s, and is washed out in a bluish skirt and
tan blouse), are you going to be able to sit there and look at his family, look at his
mother through all this? Are you going to be able to look at his mama and tell her that
her son deserves to die?
Venire person: Uhhh. . . (hesitating)
Prosecutor: (Shaking his head, turning away from the venire person on the stand, and
talking broadly to the jury pool again) Well, considering that is part of the job here.
Part of the job.
The prosecutor later moves to dismiss this potential juror. The defense attorney
in the second case takes a similar tack, trying to confirm that a different venire
person is comfortable making a decision, even if it is unpopular:
How would you feel having been told by other jurors that all immigrants should get
the worst punishment? Okay? No one can tell you that you are wrong in your choice
of which religion to belong to, right? This decision is just like that. It is a personal,
moral decision.
In case after case, the more aggressive lawyers dismiss jurors who do not
demonstrate a commitment to exercising their own moral judgment. The more
lackadaisical lawyers try to do the same, asking pro forma questions like, ‘Are
you gonna stick by that?’ or ‘Is anyone going to be able to talk you out of
that?’ and it is difficult to tell whether the venire persons’ noncommittal ‘uh-
huhs’ are heartfelt. Regardless, the jurors who are eventually empanelled have
committed to not only participate in the proceeding, but also have displayed the
willingness to take personal responsibility for their opinions. Jurors who cry or
are otherwise unable to commit to being able to sentence the defendant are
routinely dismissed.
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Having a ‘stick to your guns’ attitude (as one prosecutor put it), is not prob-
lematic per se. Previous research suggests that death qualified jurors are more likely
to issue convictions than non-death qualified jurors (see Bowers et al., 2009 for a
recent compilation of relevant studies), but more research would be needed to see
whether a juror who begins with a committed attitude is also more likely to convict.
Regardless, the present study’s finding signals particular attention paid to recruit-
ing jurors who are willing to take personal responsibility for making a punishment
decision. This is the second practice common to capital sentencing trials: they
employ lay people who are (or who say they are) committed to their own moral
positions and willing to judge those that the State chooses. This emphasis on juror
responsibility and independence continues in the evidentiary and deliberation
phases of capital trials.
The meeting: Hearing evidence and making the capital decision
The third component of capital jury trials comes after jurors have convicted an
offender of a capital crime. When the jury reconvenes for the second round of evi-
dence and decision making, referred to as the ‘penalty phase’, arguments as to
whether the death penalty itself is problematic are no longer allowed. That debate
has been silenced in death qualification. Only material that helps link the particular
characteristics of the offender to the appropriate punishment is given into evidence.
This can be a lengthy and greatly varied set of procedures, which cannot be enumer-
ated here. Evidence generally falls into three categories: evidence about the offen-
der’s past; evidence about the damage caused to victim’s survivors; and evidence
about the offender’s potential actions in future. Testimony as to a defendant’s prior
bad acts, criminal record, or lack of remorse, for example, are presented as aggra-
vators, meant to encourage juries to vote in favor of death. Evidence as to a defen-
dant’s difficult childhood, mental illness, religious conversion, or previous good acts
is presented as mitigation, in an attempt to sway juries toward a life sentence.
This most often comes in the form of personal stories from witnesses who testify
about their interactions with the defendant. Of the more than 200 witnesses that
testified in the penalty phases of the cases that I observed, approximately 70 percent
presented such testimony. These ranged greatly in content, from neighbors and
cousins talking about the defendant’s childhood home conditions to teachers and
physicians talking about prison behavior. Here a defense attorney elicits a story
from one of the defendant’s ex-teachers, attempting to show the defendant’s more
human side:
Defense attorney: Do you remember anything special that Leonard did for you when
you were his teacher?
Witness: He, in the homeroom class he gave me a birthday party. I didn’t know it was
him. It was a surprise party but some of my coworkers knew Leonard organized it.
It was a nice party. Parents sent food in, gifts. . .
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Defense attorney: Were you touched by that?
Witness: I was very touched. The principal allowed it because Leonard went through
all the movements. He went to the proper people to get their permission. He made sure
that I was occupied enough not to find out. He was a good organizer and basically he
led the students to do this, showed a lot of respect, you know, and concern.12
In a similar vein, though with opposite purpose, family members of the victims
testify about the harm that the defendant has done.13 Here a victim’s mother
testifies about her experience learning about her daughter’s death:
She called me a couple of days before she got killed, she said, Mommy – the phone
rang, must have been about 11:30 – that was unusual. I started not to answer it, but
when I heard her voice on the answering machine, Mommy, I pick up the phone. She
says, I just called you to tell you I love you. . . Next thing I knew, the detectives was at
the door and they was telling me she was shot.
Stories such as these make up the majority of the testimony at capital penalty
phases. I heard stories about birthdays, high school proms, hunting, dance
competitions, church choir practice, child rearing, child abuse, family dinners,
and neighborhood shootings. Most often reserved for sentencing judges, such
personal testimonies are rarely presented to criminal jurors in the US sentencing
context.
Having listened to such unusual evidence, capital jurors are then asked to per-
form another unorthodox task. When jurors are asked to decide punishments, most
commonly in civil torts cases, they are set up to be addressed in objective terms,
usually in a cost/benefit analysis, often resulting in monetary penalties. For exam-
ple in a typical tort law case, a plane has crashed, investigators have found the
engine proving the manufacturer was negligent, and a jury assigns value to the
damage done. Capital jurors however are not given such a clear framework. Rather
than a strict set of laws to decide whether someone deserves the death penalty or
not, the Supreme Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence requires that each juror con-
sider his or her own moral position as well as the defendant’s social biographical
information as they see fit. ‘Guided discretion’, as this is generally referred to, is so
unusual to the US criminal justice system that it ‘effectively inspired new growth
industries in legal doctrine-making’ (Weisberg, 1983: 328). Most states attempted
to reach the balance between individual consideration and equal treatment required
by the Supreme Court by giving juries a set of aggravators and mitigators that they
are supposed to apply to a given case. Capital juries can weigh these factors as they
see fit: they might disregard mitigators they do not think should matter, such as the
school teacher’s testimony above, or find aggravators to be unnecessary to con-
sider, such as the victim’s mother’s anguish above. Rather than following a strict
set of legal evidentiary requirements as jurors do when deciding the guilt or inno-
cence of a defendant, jurors are expected to use their moral consciousness in
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conjunction with the evidence given. (For a fuller treatment of the development of
guided discretion, see Bowers et al., 2003.) This emphasis on subjective jury sen-
tencing is exceptional in a society largely committed to finding economic solutions
to questions of injury. Though judges are asked to make subjective findings in
criminal sentencing cases, death penalty sentencing is the only nationwide venue
in which a committee of lay people with no prior training is asked to participate in
such a task. This is the third component of practices common to capital jury sen-
tencing: citizens are asked to hear and evaluate evidence in a manner usually
reserved for judges.14
Discussion and conclusions: Situating capital jury sentencing
Taking these three sets of practices together, how can we make sense of this
unusual proceeding? Guided capital jury sentencing is a project of the late 20th
and early 21st centuries, shaped almost entirely during the three decades after the
Supreme Court’s 1976 decision reinstating the death penalty.15 The institutional
apparatus of late 20th- and early 21st-century criminal justice in which capital
sentencing developed looks very much like it did during most of the 20th century,
but the deployment, strategic functioning, and social significance of the apparatus
has been transformed (Garland, 2001). While death penalty sentencing was legal
and indeed quite active prior to the late modern period, the post-Furman era has
instituted a shift in how Americans decide who deserves the ultimate punishment.
One of the most important changes in the post-Furman era is the standardization of
jurors’ roles in death penalty sentencing. What do this study’s findings tell us about
the role that jury death penalty sentencing plays in the late modern criminal justice
system?
First, jurors are not asked to punish the most common types of homicide offen-
ders, but those that conform to particular cultural narratives, as we saw above.
In this way, assigning punishment – regardless of whether the punishment is life or
death – functions not just as a tool to punish individual offenders, but also a tool
for solidifying collective cultural meaning. An orderliness of the world is estab-
lished by putting people and events into categories, and blame activates a distinc-
tion between a worthy ‘us’ and an unworthy ‘them’ (Tilly, 2009). The process of
assigning one of two extreme punishments to the ‘worst’ of violent offenders sug-
gests that death penalty sentencing trials provide a process by which society, when
it is doing the extreme act of sentencing its worst offenders, is establishing that it
has the categories right. In this sense, the actions of capital sentencing jurors
support the framework of meaning sustaining the culture of control – recruiting
‘good’ citizens to judge dangerous ones.
Second, the unique practices that comprise individualized jury selection and
guided deliberations point to a complementary role for capital jury sentencing.
Non-capital offenders in the contemporary criminal justice system are generally
sorted and sentenced from a distance, usually using an economic style of reasoning;
part of the mechanism of mass incarceration is to simultaneously categorize and
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dehumanize (Garland, 2001). But capital jury sentencing trials eschew a distanced,
economic logic. Rather than dehumanizing decision-makers and offenders, the
processes of capital jury death qualification, personal story-telling, and guided
discretion ties jurors more personally to the punishment decision than in any
other arena of criminal sentencing. Taken together, the practices of solidifying
the cultural category of the ‘worst of the worst’ and tying jurors personally to
this categorization create the role of punitive citizenship. Through the deliberate
cultivation and selection of jurors who say they can take responsibility for an
ultimately subjective decision – personal to those who decide and to those who
are punished – punitive citizens agree to make individual moral punishment deci-
sions in the name of the State. Those unable to commit to participation are
excluded. The rest are asked to form a personal judgment and then donate this
judgment to the collective.
The significance of this role comes into bold relief when examined in histor-
ical context. Arendt’s (1963) famous analysis of the Eichmann trial demon-
strated how state actors eschewed particularized responsibility for lethal
actions, believing themselves to be following state rules rather than making
their own judgments. On the stand, Eichmann describes having had no
‘choice’ within the institutional directive: he did his duty, he obeyed orders,
and he obeyed the law (Arendt, 1963). By displaying the ideology of a bureau-
crat rather than that of a monster, he distanced himself from the atrocities he
took part in. Real political action, Arendt postulated in response, requires
action without pre-given structure, judging a given situation on its intrinsic
characteristics, much like a person preferring one flower to another. This expo-
sure of self is the strongest political act that one can make, and it is this strong
political choice that is asked of capital jurors. Rather than being asked to
submerge their convictions in favor of strict legal doctrine, the capital jurors’
directive is to make an active decision based on personal and immediate
response to the evidence given. They are not instructed to consider ‘what
should I make of this?’ but instead ‘what do I make of this?’ In this sense
capital jury selection look less like the quasi-legal rationality of Kantian phi-
losophy and more like a procedure based on the aesthetic philosophy that
interests Arendt.16 Rather than blindly take part in a brutal and cruel set of
practices – as Arendt’s Eichmann did – capital jurors instead are asked to
participate carefully and consciously in a set of highly structured ones.
Social studies of legal systems suggest that the recruitment of capital jurors
into punitive citizenship has consequences beyond capital courtrooms. Legal
proceedings are generally divided into two categories: those that are present
in everyday practices and those that are used when ‘trouble’ presents itself
(Sarat et al., 1998). Everyday laws regulate the practices that we rely on to
go about our daily social lives, and ‘trouble’ law deals with conflict that comes
about when norms are disobeyed or one person’s actions are incompatible with
another’s (Llewelyn and Hoebel, 1941). When there is social ‘trouble’, legal
institutions can be used to clean up social messes. As such, these types of
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legal arenas can be especially good sites to see in bold relief norms that society
has a stake in protecting. Death penalty sentencing is an extreme type of the
‘trouble’ case, meant to protect the sanctity of human life by severely punishing
those who take it. But by attending to the practices that make up the recruit-
ment of citizens into a punitive role, a second kind of ‘trouble’ is revealed. The
death penalty itself is problematic for western liberal democracies of the 21st
century. Most countries have abolished it; half the states within the United
States do not use it; and when it is used, it is always challenged in courts
and in the public sphere. It is controversial in public opinion, state policy,
and the media. When actors invest unusual focus in a social drama of their
own making – such as with the extensive attention given to capital jury culti-
vation and selection – socially substantial issues are at play (Evens and
Handelman, 2006). The social function of capital jury sentencing from this
perspective might be to neutralize cultural unease by sharing the responsibility
of sentencing with citizens. By recruiting jurors into the role of punitive citizen-
ship, the State is blurring the lines of responsibility, making the controversial
state action more tolerable.
In this sense, the post-Furman standardization of capital juror participation
looks to be part of the shift from pre-modern to modern practices of punishment.
By recruiting capital jurors, the highly controversial institution is in at least one
aspect, disciplined. Both juror and offender are party to a set of procedures that
belongs more closely to Foucault’s (1975) modern regulatory institutions such as
the school, the prison, or the mental hospital than to the pre-modern scaffolding
meant to brutally exhibit the State’s power. Replacing the spectacle of sentencing is
a rationalized, quiet procedure that works not only on those that are witness to it,
but that exists in conjunction with other technologies of discipline to regulate the
population at large.17 By attending to the persistent inequalities in the American
capital punishment system, scholars have learned much about the institution’s
retention of its pre-modern qualities of cruelty and discrimination. But in order
to fully understand the social role of post-Furman capital trials in the late modern
US criminal justice system, we must also attend to capital trial practices that do
more subtle work. The disciplinary qualities of juror cultivation and participation
are some of the many dynamics of capital punishment to which we cannot have
access unless we attend to capital trial practices.
We cannot know whether the Justices who decided Furman, Greg, and their
progeny intended to firm up jurors’ role in capital sentencing in order to quiet
concerns about the institution more generally. But we can interrogate the con-
sequences. Doing so in this case sheds light on several new areas of inquiry.
First, if the modern criminal justice system recruits punitive citizens as one
means of taming the troubled institution of the death penalty, future research
might ask where else citizens are recruited in the criminal justice system. How
are jurors recruited in non-capital cases that are otherwise problematic, for
example? Second, does citizen recruitment help states accomplish unpopular
tasks in other situations? Is there a difference between the ways soldiers are
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recruited during times of more and less popular wars? Are citizens recruited by
state actors when police violence occurs? What more can we learn from the
intersection between state and citizen action in controversial institutions?
Finally, what might death penalty sentencing look like without juror participa-
tion in sentencing? Are there other ways of guaranteeing that the defendant
receives both individual consideration and equal protection? Could the death
penalty institution survive in the post-Furman era without the recruitment of
punitive citizens?
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Notes
1. Sarat (2002), writing about his observations of a capital trial, is a notable exception.
2. There are occasional exceptions to this rule. For example, Ohio allows a defendant
to be sentenced before a three-judge panel. There is also on-going litigation in
Delaware, Florida, and Alabama about whether judges should be allowed to over-
ride jury sentencing decisions.
3. I use the masculine pronoun throughout because the vast majority of capital defen-
dants are male.
4. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2000, Bulletin NCJ
198821; Federal Bureau of Investigation http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/02cius.htm. In the
last several years, numbers of death sentences and executions have been decreasing.
For a discussion of why, see Bowers and Sunby (2009).
5. I confirmed this with others in the field, including representatives from the Death
Penalty Information Center and the Department of Justice.
6. 233 news reports from 2005, compiled from the American Judicature Society Capital
Case Data Project, available at: http://www.ajs.org/jc/death//jc_death.asp.
7. The technique of ‘systematic’ rather than random sampling was done in accordance
with the National Science Foundation’s Qualitative Research Design and Methods:
Strengths, and Shared and Unique Standards, http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/
ISSQR_workshop_rpt.pdf . See in particular page 12. Further information on case
selection is available from the author.
8. Exactly what constitutes an ‘aggravated’ murder varies from state to state. This
statutory determination of death-eligible homicides is itself a process laden with
symbolic capital (Simon and Spaulding, 1999; Kirchmeier, 1998, 2006).
9. The articles I used were compiled by the American Judicature Society Capital Case
Data Project and David McCord. McCord (2005) makes a similar argument about
the use of this data as proxy.
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10. This is especially interesting when taken in juxtaposition to studies suggesting that
non-white offenders convicted of murdering white victims are more likely to be
executed than any other group (Baldus et al., 2009). Further research would be
needed to compare offenders at trial to offenders at execution. We might ask: is a
different demographic population tried for capital murders than that which receives
a sentence of death? What does the population of offenders who are tried capitally
and given life sentences by juries look like? These are some of the questions that can
only be filled in with national data on capital trials.
11. Simon and Spaulding (1999) make a similar argument about the cultural uses of
state aggravating factors. This is not to suggest that the selection of capital defen-
dants is dictated by cultural variables alone. Structural considerations, such as
funding allocation, are likely contributing factors. We cannot know why these
defendants are tried capitally as opposed to other defendants, without further
study.
12. The names of all trial participants are changed to protect privacy.
13. Victim impact testimony has become a major component of capital sentencing
trials since 1991, when the Supreme Court issued its controversial decision Payne
v. Tennessee (501 US 808 (1991)).
14. Jury sentencing in non-capital criminal cases, however, is also occasionally used.
15. This is not to say that this is the first involvement of jurors with sentencing. In fact
juries have been involved in punishing criminals since the late Middle Ages. But the
standardized form of jury sentencing that I describe is new in the late 20th century.
16. Interestingly, evidence from interviews with capital jurors suggests that they may or
may not internalize this responsibility. Some jurors tend to minimize their roles
after the fact (Bowers and Foglia, 2003), while others find the process emotionally
traumatic (Antonio, 2006; Bienen, 1993).
17. Garland (1990: 134) describes such techniques as ‘epitomizing’ wider social forms,
not because they are typical, but because the general form of modern power is
‘revealed in the full unbridled operation’ in the penal institution. Capital juror
participation does not conform, however, to the usual disciplinary technology in
one important aspect. Rather than rendering human emotion irrelevant to a cold
and distant state apparatus, as most disciplinary technologies tend to do, death
penalty sentencing binds active human subjectivity more tightly to the punishment
process.
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